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  Government policies are routinely subjected to rigorous cost analyses.  Yet one of today’s 
most controversial and expensive policies—the ongoing war in Iraq—has not been.  The $212 
billion allocated by the U.S. Treasury has been widely reported.  But the real, direct economic 
costs include more than budgetary allocations.  Other costs include lives lost, injuries, and lost 
civilian productivity of National Guard and Reserve troops mobilized for the conflict.  The 
conflict, however, also has generated cost savings, especially in terms of resources no longer 
being used to enforce UN sanctions and people no longer being killed by Saddam Hussein’s 
regime. 
 
  In this paper we monetize these direct costs and avoided costs of the war in Iraq, both to-
date and the total expected net present value of costs through 2015.  Our estimates are imprecise.  
The data are not of high quality and every calculation requires a number of assumptions.  In 
addition, we do not calculate indirect effects of the conflict, such as its impact on oil prices or 
other macroeconomic impacts, or certain intangibles, like the benefits of a stable democratically 
elected government in Iraq, should one emerge.  Nonetheless, our best estimates suggests that the 
direct economic costs to the U.S. through August 2005 are about $255 billion, about $40 billion 
to coalition partners, and $134 billion to Iraq.  These estimates suggest a global cost to date of 
about $428 billion.  The avoided costs, meanwhile, are about $116 billion.  We estimate that the 
expected total net present value of the direct costs through 2015 could be $604 billion to the 
U.S., $95 billion to coalition partners, and $306 billion to Iraq, suggesting a global total expected 
net present value of about $1 trillion.  The net present value of total avoided costs, meanwhile, 
could be about $429 billion.  
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The Economic Costs of the War in Iraq 
 




  Government policies are routinely subjected to rigorous cost analyses.  These analyses 
are difficult, imprecise given uncertainty about the future, and controversial.  Yet they are widely 
recognized as important tools for deciding how best to allocate society’s limited resources.   
Despite the widespread use of cost-benefit analyses in governmental policy analysis, its tools 
have not been rigorously applied to one of today’s most controversial public policy issues: the 
U.S. involvement in Iraq.  U.S. budgetary allocations are widely reported, but that amount does 
not reflect the true economic cost of the conflict.  This paper takes a small step in correcting this 
omission by attempting to calculate the direct costs of the conflict. 
Several caveats regarding this analysis are in order.  First, our estimates are necessarily 
imprecise.  The available data are not of high quality, each calculation requires several 
assumptions, and the tools of cost benefit analysis are themselves controversial.
1  While we 
carefully note our sources and explain our assumptions in detail, we recognize that these 
estimates contain a great deal of error.  Second, we estimate only the direct impacts that we can 
monetize, not indirect macroeconomic impacts.
2  Third, we do not calculate intangibles, such as 
benefits of a stable, democratic government in Iraq should one emerge, or the impact of the war 
on other U.S. interests and international relations.  Finally, one of the biggest impacts may be 
how the war has affected the probability of terrorist attacks.  Unfortunately, experts do not agree 
on whether the war has increased or decreased this probability, let alone by how much. 
The implication of these caveats is that our analysis cannot determine whether the 
benefits of the war exceed the costs.  The analysis simply applies tools to this problem to begin 
to assess the war’s actual economic costs and, we hope, contribute in some small way to 
providing an analytical framework for the policy debate. 
Recognizing the inherent imprecision, we calculate high, medium, and low estimates for 
costs and avoided costs, and round to the nearest billion.  Table 1 presents our medium estimates 
                                                 
1 See Hahn (2005) for a discussion on this controversy and arguments supporting the uses of cost-benefit analysis.   
2 These effects can be large.  Hassett (2005) noted that bad news about Iraq could depress the economy even in the 
face of positive economic reports.  
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while Figure 1 shows the full range of estimates.  Table 2 presents the estimate ranges in detail.  
Using our medium estimates, we conclude that the direct measured economic cost to the U.S. 
from March 2003 through August 2005, including incremental military and other government 
resources allocated to Iraq, the opportunity cost of National Guard troops’ lost civilian 
productivity, lives lost, the costs of treating wounded soldiers and other costs of their injuries to 
be $255 billion.  The conflict has cost coalition partners an additional $40 billion.  Costs to Iraq 
itself are more difficult to calculate.  Still, under assumptions described below, we estimate that 
the costs to Iraq are about $134 billion.  Thus, the gross global direct costs of the conflict to date 
appear to be $428 billion. 
 
Table 1 
Costs of the War in Iraq 
Billions of 2005 dollars 
(medium estimate) 
           
  
Mar 2003 - 
Aug 2005 
Sept 2005 - 
Dec 2015 
Total March 
2003 - 2015 
Costs 
United States  255  349  603 
Non-U.S. Coalition 40  55  95 
Iraq 134  173  306 
TOTAL 428  576  1005 
Avoided Costs 
United States  32  85  117 
Iraq 85  228  313 
TOTAL 116  313  429 
 
 
Because the conflict is not over, it is useful to estimate the total expected net present 
value of the conflict into the future.  Using projections from the Congressional Budget Office 
regarding budget allocation and troops deployed in Iraq, we estimate the net present value of the 
conflict from 2003 through 2015 to be $603 billion to the U.S., $95 billion to coalition partners, 
and $306 billion to Iraq, for a total expected net present value of $1 trillion (with the estimate 
ranging from a low of $820 billion to a high of $1.2 trillion). 
  The main avoided costs of the war include no longer enforcing U.N. sanctions such as the 
“no-fly zone” in northern and southern Iraq and people no longer being murdered by Saddam  
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Hussein’s regime.  We estimate the value of the first to be $32 billion and the second $85 billion 
to date.  The net present value of these avoided costs through 2015 could be $429 billion. 
  Another possible impact of the conflict is a change in the probability of future major 
terrorist attacks.  Unfortunately, experts do not agree on whether the war has increased or 
decreased this probability.  Clearly, whether the direct benefits of the war exceed the costs 
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March 2003 - August 2005
United States
Military and other real government expenditures 212 212 212
Fatalities 9 14 19
I n j u r i e s 91 82 7
Lost wages of reserves 10 10 10
Total U.S. 240 255 269
Non-US Coalition Countries
Military and other real government expenditures 36 36 36
Fatalities 1 1 2
I n j u r i e s 123
Total non-U.S. coalition countries 38 40 41
Iraq
Damaged infrastructure 20 20 20
Fatalities 65 106 147
Injuries 5 8 11
Total Iraq 90 134 178
Total direct costs March 2003 - August 2005 368 428 488
September 2005 - December 2015
United States
Military and other real government expenditures 272 295 322
Fatalaties 15 24 33
Injuries 13 29 47
Total U.S. 300 349 402
Non-US Coalition Countries
Military and other real government expenditures 46 50 55
Fatalaties 1 2 3
I n j u r i e s 134
Total non-U.S. coalition countries 49 55 62
Iraq
Fatalities 81 131 182
Injuries 22 41 65
Total Iraq 103 173 246
Total expected NPV future costs 2005 - 2015 452 576 711
March 2003 - December 2015
United States 540 603 672
Non-US Coalition Countries 87 95 103
Iraq 192 306 424
TOTAL EXPECTED NET PRESENT VALUE 820 1005 1199
BENEFITS (Avoided costs)
Low Mid High
March 2003 - August 2005
Avoided containment costs (United States) 32 32 32
Avoided murders by Saddam Hussein (Iraq) 52 85 117
TOTAL avoided costs 84 116 149
September 2005 - December 2015
Avoided containment costs (United States) 78 85 93
Avoided murders by Saddam Hussein (Iraq) 140 228 316
TOTAL expected costs avoided 219 313 409
March 2003 - December 2015
United States 110 117 125
Iraq 192 313 433
TOTAL EXPECTED COSTS AVOIDED 302 429 558
Table 2
mid implies midpoint of estimates of lifetime cost of care for injuries, a 5% discount rate, and a 
U.S. VSL of $6.5 million in 2000 dollars
high implies highest estimates of lifetime cost of care for injuries, a 3% discount rate, and a 
U.S. VSL of $9 million in 2000 dollars.
Costs of War in Iraq
Billions of 2005 Dollars
COSTS
*Note: low implies lowest estimate lifetime cost of care for injuries, a 7% discount rate, and a 






  There has been much discussion regarding the costs of the conflict in Iraq.  Most of it has 
focused on budgetary allocations, currently estimated to be $212 billion.
3  The actual direct cost, 
however, is the opportunity cost of resources used in the conflict that cannot be used elsewhere 
and the welfare losses of those killed and wounded.  This cost to the U.S. includes not only 
resources used by the government, but also lost productivity of National Guard and Reserve 
troops (hereafter, “Reserves”) mobilized because of the Iraqi venture not available to do their 
civilian jobs, the value of lives lost, and injuries.  Direct global costs of the conflict also include 
similar costs by countries other than the U.S., including Iraq. 
This paper is not the first to estimate the economic costs of a war in Iraq.  Prior to the war 
several economists conducted prospective cost estimates.
4  Nordhaus (2002) noted that the costs 
of wars are typically underestimated ex ante.  He estimated that the net present value of the cost 
of prosecuting a war, rebuilding, and the resulting macroeconomic effects could range from $100 
billion to $1.9 trillion.  McKibbin and Stoeckel (2003) model the impacts on the macroeconomy 
and agree that the costs of a war would exceed the budgetary outlays.  Davis, et al. (2003) 
compare the expected costs and benefits of a war to those of continuing the policy of 
“containment” (e.g., enforcing the no-fly zone in northern and southern Iraq).  Assuming a 
moderate but steady improvement in Iraqi GDP over the following 20 years and taking into 
account the dramatic contraction in the Iraqi economy under Saddam Hussein, the authors 
conclude that the expected net benefits of a war would exceed the net benefits of containment 
and ultimately lead to welfare improvements. 
Those papers were all written before the war began.  To our knowledge, there has been 
no similar rigorous analysis of the costs of the war since the war began.  We hope to fill that gap.  




                                                 
3 This figure includes Iraq-specific appropriations, in 2005 dollars. 
4 Some government agencies projected fiscal costs.  The Congressional Budget Office (2002) projected a cost to the 
U.S. Treasury of $9-$13 billion to deploy troops, $6-$9 billion a month for fighting a war, $1-$4 billion a month for 
occupying the country, and $5-$7 billion to return the troops to their home bases.   The House Budget Democratic 
Committee Staff (2002) estimated that a war would cost the Treasury $100 - $200 billion.  
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3. Costs to the United States 
 
  The total direct economic costs to the U.S. of the conflict in Iraq are comprised of a 
number of factors.  In this section we describe those factors, discuss issues involved in 
calculating their costs, and then attempt to estimate those costs.  In some cases, expenses 
commonly counted as costs are, in an economic sense just pecuniary transfers, while other 
factors typically ignored are real economic costs. 
 
Military and government expenditures 
  The most widely-reported cost of the conflict is the cost to the federal treasury as 
reflected in incremental budget allocations approved by Congress.  These allocations have 
included funds for moving troops, military hardware, combat pay, reconstruction, training and 
equipping Iraqi security forces, and support for allies.  This amount is expected to be nearly $213 
billion by September 2005.
5  While all of these expenditures affect the federal budget, some of 
them are not real costs in the economic sense.  Real costs are economic resources not used for 
other purposes.  Transfers are dollars moved from one place to another but do not represent 
economic resources diverted to, in this case, the Iraqi venture.  Transfers do have a real cost—the 
distortions to the economy caused by raising revenues (taxing or borrowing)—but the transfers 
themselves are not real economic costs.
6 
  Most of the appropriations for Iraq represent real costs.  Moving troops, using munitions, 
reconstruction, training and equipping Iraqi security forces, supporting allies, and replacing and 
repairing military hardware are real costs.  Regular compensation for active-duty soldiers is not a 
cost of the war as they would be paid regardless of the conflict.  Their combat pay, however, is 
included in the incremental budgetary allocations and is properly considered a cost of the war 
assuming it reflects troops’ risk-adjusted opportunity cost.  We are unsure if the best measure of 
Reservists’ opportunity cost is their military pay.  Paying the Reserves is costly to the Treasury, 
but most Reservists probably did not expect to spend so much time in combat zones away from 
their civilian occupations.  As a result, their opportunity cost is probably better represented by 
                                                 
5 Cost is in 2005 dollars. This includes Iraq-specific appropriations from April 2003, November 2003, August 2004, 
and April 2005.  
6 These costs may be substantial.  Feldstein (1999) estimates that the deadweight loss of income taxes could be more 
than 30 percent of revenue raised.  
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their lost civilian productivity, not their military pay.  From government expenditures, therefore, 
we subtract Reservists’ pay, and in a section below we add back the opportunity cost of using the 
Reserves based on their civilian wages.  Table 3 shows the economic cost of the extra budget 
appropriations in 2005 dollars to be $210 billion. 
 
Table 3 
U.S. Iraq-specific appropriations 
(Billions of dollars) 
Date of 
appropriation 
Nominal 2005  Dollars
7 
April 2003  57  59 
November 2003  70  73 
August 2004
8 22 22 
April 2005  59  59 





9  203 210 
 
 
National Guard and reserves 
  Reserves play a crucial role in Iraq.  In 2005, about 40 percent of the approximately 
140,000 troops on active duty have been from the National Guard or Reserves
10 and an 
additional 63,000 have been mobilized to replace active-duty troops who are now in Iraq.
11  The 
opportunity cost of using these troops is their productivity lost from the U.S. economy.  If we 
assume that as civilians they are paid their marginal product, then their lost civilian wages reflect 
the economic cost of their participation in the war.  Data from the Department of Defense, U.S. 
Census, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics allow us to estimate their lost wages.  In 2005, the 
Congressional Budget Office published data gathered from the Department of Defense on the 
civilian occupations of selected reservists.
12 Combined with data from the Bureau of Labor and 
                                                 
7 Real amounts calculated using monthly GDP deflator. See Bureau of Economic Analysis (2005). 
8 Note: Nominal and real dollar amounts are equal only because of rounding. 
9 Differences between subtotal and total and individual appropriations are due to rounding error. 
10 The Brookings Institution (2005). 
11 Congressional Budget Office (2005). 
12 Congressional Budget Office (2005).   
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Statistics on average hourly wages and hours worked in each of these occupations, we calculate 
the average annual salary of the typical reservist from their civilian occupation.   
Table 4 shows the share of Reserve troops that work in various industries, the average 
hourly wages of those industries, and the average number of hours worked each week.  These 
figures suggest that, on average, the Reserve soldiers earn about $33,000 per year as civilians.  
As the table shows, these numbers imply that the opportunity cost of using Reserve troops at 
current levels is $3.9 billion per year, or $10.3 billion to date. 
 
Table 4 

























33% 23.33 36.1  44,925  38,324 
Sales and office  18%  14.41  34.35  26,403  20,904 




16% 14.78 37.5  29,565  18,581 




1%     20,056 1,161 




  The most striking cost of the conflict is the lives lost as a result.  Soldiers’ deaths and the 
suffering of their families are reported daily, but have not been included in any analyses of the 
costs of the war.  Monetizing life is understandably controversial—how can a dollar figure 
reflect the death of a child, spouse, or parent?  Indeed, economic analyses do not attempt to value 
any particular individual’s life.  Instead, they assess how much individuals are willing to pay to 
                                                 
13 Includes both reserve troops stationed in Iraq and reserve troops called to duty to fill the positions of normal 
active-duty soldiers called to Iraq (reserve troop “backfill”). This is the average number of Reserve and National 
Guard troops required at any given moment (we took the average over 2003-August 2005).  
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reduce their risks of death and use that information to calculate a “value of a statistical life” 
(VSL).  In policy analysis these assessments are a crucial tool for evaluating whether benefits 
outweigh costs and whether society’s limited resources are being deployed in an effective way.  
Even if analysts try to avoid this sensitive issue by not explicitly monetizing statistical lives, 
policies will implicitly do so anyway.  For example, if a proposed policy is expected to cost $1 
billion and its benefit is to save two lives, then the policy has implicitly valued a statistical life at 
$500 million.  Policy makers and analysts need some way of deciding whether such a policy 
would be a good investment.  Monetizing statistical lives by measuring how much people 
actually pay to reduce risks provides a coherent way of making this decision. 
  The process of estimating these values, however, is fraught with uncertainty and error.
14  
Economists use observed responses to risks to estimate how people value their own lives.  As 
discussed above, one can evaluate what people’s actions reveal about how much they are willing 
to pay to reduce their risks of dying by a small amount.  One common way to estimate how much 
people are willing to pay to mitigate risks is to evaluate the inverse question of how much more 
must people paid to take riskier jobs.  Viscusi and Aldy (2003) review the enormous body of 
literature on the subject, and find that studies tend to yield values between $4 million and $9 
million per statistical life in 2000 dollars, though Viscusi (2004) shows that estimated values can 
vary across industries, occupations, and individual characteristics.
15 
In this paper we use this range of VSL estimates from the economics literature.
16  While 
we calculate a range for all of our estimates, here we present costs based on a VSL of $6.5 
                                                 
14 Valuing statistical lives is controversial in other ways, too.  For example, should age matter so that the lives of the 
elderly are valued differently from the lives of younger people (see, e.g., Hahn and Wallsten 2003)?  Because 
individual’s willingness to pay is correlated with ability to pay, do these methods imply that poor people are worth 
less than rich people (see, e.g., Sunstein 2004)? 
15 Sometimes other methods are used to calculate a value of life.  Unlike the economic approach that values 
statistical lives (VSL), other approaches try to value individual’s lives.  Tort law, for example, in most states 
estimates the net present value of an individual’s lost future income as compensation for wrongful death.  As Posner 
and Sunstein (2004) note, this approach has the advantage of allowing flexible values that can differ across 
individuals, but has disadvantages including, for example, automatically valuing poor people less than rich people 
and children less than adults (because they will not begin earning money until far into the discounted future).  The 
authors find that the average wrongful death settlement in 2001 was $3.1 million and the median $1.1 million.  The 
lost-wages approach was generally used to compensate survivors of 9/11 victims.  Compensation ranged from 
$250,000 to $7.1 million, and the average award was $2.1 million per family (Posner and Sunstein 2004). 
16 Most American deaths in Iraq are military, which calls into question the use of established VSL from the 
literature.  Data on active-duty soldiers are typically excluded from VSL analyses in part because data collected by 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics excludes the military and in part because soldiers face atypical nonlinearities in their 
compensation and job risks.  In particular, military service is voluntary, but once someone has volunteered he cannot 
generally refuse to be sent into combat.  In addition, soldiers have a standard compensation schedule but receive 
additional imminent danger (combat) pay when sent to an area classified as a combat zone.  We attempted to derive  
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million, the midpoint of those estimates.  Between March 20, 2003 and August 25, 2005, 1,877 
U.S. troops and an additional 97 U.S. contractors were killed in Iraq. We thus find the cost of 
lives lost, in 2005 dollars, to be $14 billion. 
 
Wounded 
  The injured and wounded represent another real cost of the war.  The economic cost of 
these injuries is the net present value of the cost of treatment and future care plus the cost of the 
injury to the person wounded.  None of these costs is easy to estimate. 
In a New York Times editorial, Bilmes (2005) used disability payments and health care 
expenditures from the 1991 Gulf War to extrapolate an annual cost for the number of wounded in 
the current conflict.  She then assumed these payments would be required for the next 45 years, 
concluding that they could ultimately reach $1.3 trillion.  Her approach, while a good start, is 
problematic.  First, disability payments themselves are a budgetary transfer and not a real cost.  
To the extent that they differ from lost productivity they may over- or under-state the loss to the 
economy resulting from injured soldiers’ inability or reduced ability to work.  In addition, they 
are unlikely to be based on values that individuals themselves place on avoiding injuries.   
Second, the types of injuries sustained during the first Gulf War may be different from those 
sustained by troops today.  Third, the calculation did not discount future expenditures.  One 
dollar spent 45 years from now is worth much less than one dollar spent today. 
We use data from the Defense Department, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and medical 
journals to estimate the number of wounded, the types of injuries, and typical costs of treating 
those injuries.  The appendix describes our methodology in detail.  The cost of the injuries extends 
beyond the resources employed for treatment and care.  It also includes the welfare loss to the 
wounded individual.  This value, or the value of a statistical injury, can be inferred by measuring 
what people are actually willing to pay to reduce the risks of certain types of injuries (Viscusi 
and Aldy 2003). 
Using these types of studies, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the 
Centers for Disease Control Trauma research program has classified injuries by their severity 
                                                                                                                                                             
a rough method for estimating a military VSL based on combat pay and the expected probability of death in a 
combat zone derived from U.S. experience in Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Restore Hope in Somalia, and 
Uphold Democracy in Haiti.  Our approach yielded a military VSL of $6.1 million, with a range of $5.5 million to 
$7.5 million, well within ranges established in the existing literature.  However, our model of military VSL is not 
complete, and we leave it to future research to more fully derive and estimate the model.  
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and calibrated them to value of statistical life.
17  They classify injuries as minor, moderate, 
serious, severe, critical, and fatal. Relative to the value of a statistical life, these injuries are 
0.0020, 0.016, 0.058, 0.19, 0.76, and 1, respectively.
18  We use information from the Department 
of Defense
19 on the types of injuries sustained by soldiers, information from various medical 
experts on the severity of injuries,
20 estimates from NIH, the Neurotrauma registry, and the 
National Association of State Head Injury Administrators on the typical costs of rehabilitation 
and care for such injuries,
21 and the VSL calibration method discussed above to derive a cost of 
different types of injuries. 
Table 5 presents data on numbers of wounded, types of injuries, average lifetime 
treatment costs, and statistical value of such injuries.  Based on these estimates and assuming 
that the lifetime cost of care numbers represent their total discounted net present value, we 
estimate the net present value of caring for those injured to date to be $6.6 billion.  We classify 
the types of injuries sustained on the scale of minor to severe and calculate the costs of those 
injuries calibrated to our estimated military VSL, as described above.  The total cost of injuries is 
$11.5 billion.  Using our medium cost of care estimates, we thus estimate that the net present 








                                                 
17 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (1994). 
18 Thanks to Bob Hahn for pointing me to Hahn and Tetlock (1999), which employed NHTSA’s methodology for 
estimating costs of injuries, and for thinking through a reasonable way to measure military VSL.  These estimates 
assume that individuals take into account the financial costs that they would bear if suffering from injuries when 
choosing how much to pay to reduce risks.  If individuals had to bear the full cost of treatment and care, then it 
would be inappropriate to also add in those costs as they should be incorporated into the willingness-to-pay 
estimates.  The studies, however, are generally conducted on data on workers or employed people likely to have 
health insurance.  Those with comprehensive health insurance are unlikely to consider the financial costs of their 
care when making decisions that affect their risk of injury, making it appropriate to consider those costs separately. 
19 See Mishra (2004). 
20 See Woodford  (2005), Marchi et al. (1999), and Ross et al. (1998). 





Costs of Injuries, 2003-August 2005 






























Injury resulting in 
inability to return 




24% 3389  0  $0.26  0.9 
Injured, but able 
to return to duty 
50% 7060  0  $0.06  0.4 
Total 100%  14,120      18.2 
 
Other costs 
  In addition to the major economic costs discussed above, the conflict involves a number 
of other relatively small, but real, costs.  These include: 
•  The cost to military families of additional armor and equipment they purchase and send 
directly to troops.  In October 2004 an amendment included in the FY2005 National 
Defense Authorization Act authorized the government to reimburse families for 
“protective, safety, and health equipment” up to the lesser of the amount the family paid 
or $1100. 
•  The costs to employers of finding and training temporary replacements for civilian jobs 
vacated by Reserves.
23 
                                                 
22 See Appendix for more detail. 
23 The Congressional Budget Office (2005) notes that “hiring a new employee may require significant expenditures 
for recruiting, administration, and training…” but does not estimate those costs.  
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Net present value of the cost of the conflict to the U.S. 
  Aggregating together the cost to date of military operations, lives lost, injuries, and lost 
civilian production of Guard and Reserve troops, we find that through August 2005, the war has 
cost the U.S. about $255 billion. 
 
4. Costs to Other Coalition Countries 
 
  While the United States bears a great deal of the costs, the other countries in the coalition 
also have real costs.  We do not have good data on coalition costs.  Non-US coalition troops have 
averaged 17% of U.S. troop levels,
24 most of those from the U.K.  If we assume that real military 
costs are proportional to U.S. costs, then non-U.S. military coalition costs have been $36 billion. 
Most of the research that estimates values of statistical lives has focused on U.S. data, 
complicating our calculation of the cost of these deaths.  Studies of VSL in other countries, 
however, when examined together reveal a positive correlation between national income and the 
value of a statistical life (Viscusi and Aldy 2003).  In a meta-analysis of 49 studies, Viscusi and 
Aldy (2003) find an elasticity of income with respect to value of life ranging from 0.5 to 0.6.  We 
thus take the midpoint of this estimate (0.55) and per capita income figures from coalition 
countries to estimate the value of non-American lives lost. 
According to the Brookings Institution (2005) and Iraq Coalition Casualty Count (2005), 
between March 20, 2003 and August 21, 2005, at least 237 non-U.S. coalition troops and non-
U.S. coalition civilians died in the conflict.
25 With these estimates, we use the U.S. figure of $6.5 
million (2000 dollars) per statistical life, the average income of coalition countries, and Viscusi 
and Aldy’s (2003) elasticity estimates to calculate a value of lost non-U.S. coalition lives.  Table 
6 shows the data, calculations, and results.  The table reveals that under these assumptions, the 





                                                 
24 Averaged over May 2003 to August 2005. 




Costs of lives lost in coalition countries 














United Kingdom  124  38098  0.950  6.7  831 
Bulgaria 19  3347  0.494  3.5  66 
Denmark 2  49182  1.095  7.7  15 
El Salvador  2  2410  0.482  3.4  7 
Estonia 2  9112  0.570  4.0  8 
Hungary 2  10978  0.594  4.2  8 
Italy 28  31874  0.868  6.1  172 
Kazakhstan 1  3453 0.495  3.5  3 
Latvia 1  6559  0.536  3.8  4 
Netherlands 3  38320 0.953  6.7  20 
Poland 19  8082  0.556  3.9  75 
Slovakia 3  9305  0.572  4.0  12 
Spain 11  27074  0.805  5.7  63 
Thailand 2  2665  0.485  3.4  7 
Ukraine 18  1748  0.473  3.3  60 
Total              1,351 
 
 
  Non-U.S. coalition troops and civilians have also been wounded.  We assume that the 
types of injuries sustained occur in the same proportion, that the costs of treatment are identical 
across countries, and that the value of statistical injuries has the same income elasticity as the 
value of statistical lives across countries (0.55).  With that information combined with per capita 
income for each country, we can calculate the economic costs of injuries. We find that the net 
present value of injuries to coalition troops and civilians is $2 billion. Thus, the net present value 
of costs to-date for non-US coalition countries is $40 billion. 
 
5. Costs to Iraq 
 
  Iraq has obviously been affected more than any other country by the conflict, and 
calculating the costs to that country involves by far the most uncertainties.  Direct costs include  
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infrastructure destroyed, deaths, and injuries.  The available data on all of these costs is 
questionable, so the calculations presented here must be considered carefully. 
 
Infrastructure destroyed 
  A thorough tally of destroyed infrastructure is not publicly available, but the World Bank 
estimated reconstruction costs (O'Hanlon 2005; World Bank 2003).  We can use these estimates 
as proxies for the value of destroyed infrastructure.  According to these estimates, infrastructure 
and agriculture and water resources will require $27.2 billion between 2004 and 2007.
26  The 
Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund from the United States includes about $7 billion for 
infrastructure and water resources and is included in the budget allocations discussed above.
27  
We assign the remaining $20 billion of damaged infrastructure as a cost to Iraq.  
  
Death and injuries 
  Few sources provide information on the number of Iraqis who have died.  Nonetheless, 
sources that seem the most reliable suggest that 5,091 Iraqi military and police officers and 
23,654 civilians have died since the war began.
28  We use the income elasticity of 0.55 from 
Viscusi and Aldy (2003) and Iraq’s pre-war per capita income levels to derive an Iraqi VSL of 
about $3.5 million.
29  These estimates yield a cost of loss of life to Iraq to be about $106 billion. 
  Data on Iraqi injuries are even scarcer than on deaths. We assume that Iraqi troops face 
the same types of injuries faced by U.S. troops (and in the same proportions), that the costs of 
treatment in Iraq are proportional to the costs in the U.S. (where the proportion is the ratio of 
Iraq’s pre-war GDP to U.S. GDP), and that the value of statistical injuries has the same income 
elasticity as the value of statistical lives across countries (0.55).  With that information we can 
calculate the economic costs of injuries. We find that the net present value of the cost of injuries 
to Iraqis to date is $8 billion. 
                                                 
26 O’Hanlon (2005) shows that the World Bank and CPA estimated that an additional $28 billion is required for 
other reconstruction efforts, including “health, education, employment creation,” oil, and environment.  We exclude 
these expenditures from our estimate because it is not clear from the report that these funds are to repair 
infrastructure damaged during the war.  
27 See U.S. Department of State (2005). 
28 As of August 16, 2005. See Iraq Body Count Database (2005). 
29 This figure is reasonably close to results of studies conducted in other developing countries. Shanmugam (1996/7) 
estimated a value of $1.2 million to $1.5 million per statistical life in India (in 2000 dollars as reported by Viscusi 
and Aldy 2003).  
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6. Expected Net Present Value of Costs 
 
  The estimates above provide the net present value of the cost of the war to-date.  We are 
also interested in the expected costs going forward.  Nobody knows how long the conflict will 
last, so projections regarding the future should be treated with some skepticism.  Nonetheless, 
the Congressional Budget Office (2005) projected budget outlays and the number of troops in 
Iraq to 2015.  To estimate an expected net present value, we assume that the death and injury rate 
will be the same as the average over the past two years.  With that assumption, the CBO’s budget 
and troop estimates, and a five percent discount rate, we estimate that the expected net present 
value of the cost of the conflict from September 2005 through 2015 could be $349 billion to the 
U.S., $55 billion to non-U.S. coalition countries, and $173 billion to Iraq, for a global expected 
net present value from September 2005 through 2015 of $576 billion. 
Combining the expected net present value of future costs with the net present value of 
costs to-date, we estimate the net present value of the conflict from 2003 through 2015 to be 
$603 billion to the U.S., $95 billion to coalition partners, and $306 billion to Iraq, for a total 
expected net present value of $1 trillion 
 
7. Avoided Costs 
 
  The costs outlined above are not the net incremental costs of the war.  Regardless of the 
war’s impact on future terrorism, it has also resulted in two cost savings.  The main benefit to the 
U.S. is no longer using resources to enforce U.N. sanctions.  One direct benefit to Iraq is the 
people not murdered by Saddam Hussein. 
 
U.N. sanctions 
  Prior to the war, the U.S. was enforcing U.N. resolutions such as “no-fly” zones, 
sanctions, and inspections.  Davis, et al. (2003) estimated the annual economic costs of that 
operation to be $13 billion.  Having avoided that cost since March 2003 yields a benefit of about 
$32 billion to date. 
Davis, et al. (2003) also estimated the expected net present value of enforcing this policy 
for the next three decades.  The authors used a two percent discount rate and assumed a three  
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percent chance in any given year that the Iraqi leadership would change in a way that would 
allow the U.S. to cease enforcing a containment policy.  We adopt the Davis, et al. (2003) 
assumption of a three percent chance of regime change in any year, but use a five percent 
discount rate to be consistent with other calculations in our analysis and with government 
recommendations regarding discounting.  With the five percent discount rate, the net present 
value of avoiding containment costs, from March 2003 through December 2015 is $117 billion. 
 
Iraqi deaths under Saddam Hussein 
  As discussed above, many Iraqis have died as a result of the war.  By all accounts, 
however, Saddam Hussein’s regime was particularly brutal, with hundreds of thousands killed 
under his regime.  We use the Davis, et al. (2003) assumption, based on a large number of other 
sources, of about 10,000 people dying premature deaths annually under Saddam Hussein’s 
regime and a three percent chance of regime change each year. With those assumptions, our 
value of Iraqi VSL derived above, and a five percent discount rate, we estimate that removing 
Saddam Hussein has saved, in expected terms, 83,018 lives over the next ten years, for a net 
present value of $228 billion between September 2005 and December 2015. 
 
8. Change in Likelihood of Terrorism: Cost or Benefit? 
 
  One justification for the conflict is to reduce the risks of terrorism.  Unfortunately, while 
supporters of the war argue that the conflict has made the world safer from terrorism, opponents 
counter that it has increased the risk of terrorism.  The U.S. State Department tracks terrorist 
attacks around the world.
30  We reproduce this information in Table 7.  These reports cannot 
provide enough data to answer the crucial question: would terrorism have been lower or higher 








                                                 




Global terrorist attacks 
Year  Number of 
Attacks  Killed Wounded 
2000
31 423  405  791 
2001
32 348  4655  1,080 
2002
33 199  725  2,013 
2003
34 208  625  3646 
2004
35 651  1907  9300 
 
 
  Bram and Orr (2002) estimate that the 9/11 terrorist attacks cost between $33 and $36 
billion.
36  If removing Saddam Hussein from power reduced the probability of such an attack by 
10 percent in each year, this would result in expected benefits of about $3.5 billion per year.  
Conversely, if the war has increased the probability of a major terrorist attack by 5 percent in 
each year, then this becomes an extra cost of $3.5 billion per year.  Clearly, one key determinant 
in whether the conflict in Iraq has a net positive or negative economic impact depends crucially 




In this paper we estimate the direct costs and avoided costs of the war in Iraq from three 
perspectives: the United States, coalition partners, and Iraq.  The conflict, however, has 
economic implications beyond these direct impacts.  The most obvious is its indirect 
macroeconomic impacts on the U.S. and the world.  The war may influence oil prices, for 
example, with ripple effects through the economy.  In January 2003, oil cost about $32 per barrel 
but increased to around $70 per barrel by the end of August 2005.  Estimates of the conflict’s 
macroeconomic impact to date will depend crucially on assumptions regarding how much of this 
increase is due to Iraq and regarding how much future changes up or down are due to Iraq.  
                                                 
31 U.S. Department of State (2001). 
32 U.S. Department of State (2002). 
33 U.S. Department of State (2003). 
34 U.S. Department of State (2004). 
35 Brennan (2005). 
36 Davis, et al. (2005) believe this estimate is too low, and that the true costs probably exceeded $50 billion.  
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Iraq’s economy, meanwhile, was decimated by Saddam Hussein and U.N. sanctions before the 
war and probably nearly completely destroyed during the war.  Its economy, however, as 
measured by GDP, has apparently begun a substantial recovery.  Kamp, et al. (2005) note that 
Iraq’s GDP more than doubled between August 2003 and August 2005.  The war could also 
result in other, intangible, costs and benefits.  A successful, stable, democratically elected 
government in Iraq could yield substantial benefits.  Contrarily, some are concerned about future 
costs of an emerging theocracy or more severe civil conflict.  We do not deal with these 
important questions. 
In addition, even the costs that we can monetize must be considered skeptically.  Good, 
publicly-available data are largely unavailable, each calculation requires a number of 
assumptions, and we push the already-controversial tools of cost-benefit analysis beyond their 
standard uses.  
Nonetheless, this analysis is, we believe, the first to attempt to rigorously examine the 
direct economic costs of the war in Iraq.  We estimate that through August 2005 the war has cost 
the U.S. $255 billion, coalition partners $40 billion, and Iraq $134 billion.  The costs avoided by 
Saddam Hussein no longer being in power are about $116 billion.  Using Congressional Budget 
Office estimates regarding the expected additional time U.S. troops will be in Iraq, we estimate 
that the expected net present value of the conflict from September 2005 through 2015 could be 
$349 billion to the US, $55 billion to coalition partners, and $173 billion to Iraq.  The net present 
value of avoided costs during that time is $313 billion.  We thus find that the total direct costs of 
the war could exceed $1 trillion, while the costs avoided could be $429 million. 
We recognize that our estimates are incomplete and crude.  Nonetheless, they show the 
substantial costs involved in fighting this war.  Some costs are already sunk, but the analysis 
suggests that future costs may be significant.  Hopefully policy makers and others that have 
better data than we have can refine our approach and assess whether the benefits justify the costs.  
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Appendix: Injury Value Calculation Methodology 
 
This appendix is a detailed description of how we valued injuries to U.S. and coalition 
troops.  In particular, it describes our estimates of the lifetime costs of injuries already incurred 
as well as our predictions for the remainder of 2005 through 2015. Where possible, we have used 
U.S. government estimates of the level of U.S. involvement in Iraq to date and in the future and 
conventional values of injury and lifetime care derived from economists and experts in the fields 
of risk analysis and medicine. 
 
U.S. calculations, 2003 - August 2005 
Not all troops injured in Iraq sustained the same types of injuries. A large number of 
injuries appear to be relatively mild and less costly than others. We create four categories of 
injuries. First, severe brain injuries afflict 20% of injured troops.
37 Second, about 6% of injured 
troops face amputations.
38 Statistics also show that over 50% of those wounded in Iraq are 
unable to return to duty.
39 To be conservative in our estimates, we assumed that exactly 50% of 
injured soldiers could not return to duty and the 26% of troops with severe brain injuries or 
amputations is included in this group. That leaves an additional 24% who did not receive a 
severe brain injury or amputation but whom are unable to return to duty. We thus assume that the 
50 percent of troops who could return to duty suffered only minor to moderate injuries.  
In order to quantify the severity of each of these types of injuries, we used an index 
commonly used by medical experts called the abbreviated injury scale (AIS), shown in Table 
A.1. Empirical economics research has used the AIS scale to calculate the value of statistical 
injuries. For example, the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (1994) has 
endorsed and used the scale as a tool for trying to estimate the costs of traffic accidents. This 
scale categorizes injuries into five groups—minor, moderate, serious, severe, and critical. Hahn 
and Tetlock (1999) map injury severity into willingness to pay to avoid the injury, also shown in 
                                                 
37 This is a highly cited statistic from the U.S. military. See, for example, Schlesinger (2003). 
38 Data compiled by the U.S. Senate that was part of the 2005 defense appropriations bill indicates that 6% of those 
wounded in Iraq have required amputations. See Mishra (2004). 
39 Data are from the Pentagon. See Mishra (2004).  
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Table A.1. Using these willingness to pay ratios as well as conventional values of statistical 
life,




Injuries by Type and Implied Values of Statistical Injury 
Score on 
AIS scale 
Types of injuries  
with this score 
41 
Willingness 













Includes contusion or sprain of 





Includes knee or ankle sprains, 
finger amputation, carpal, tarsal, 




Includes open or displaced 
fractures of long bones, arterial 
lacerations, hand or foot 




Includes leg amputation or crush 
and pelvic crush, moderate to 








Because the types of injuries faced by troops in Iraq do not neatly fit into each of these 
categories, we specify a range of AIS scores for each injury type. This range is detailed in Table 
A.2. We calculate the willingness to pay to avoid each type of injury by taking the midpoints of 
the two AIS scores in the range. 
 
                                                 
40 See, for example, Viscusi and Aldy (2003). Our calculations are based on a value of statistical life (U.S.) in 2000 
dollars of $6.5 million. This is the midpoint of two common values of statistical life (in 2000 dollars): $3 million 
(low) and $9 million (high). We estimated the value of each statistical injury with an assume value of statistical life 
of $3 million, $6.5 million, and $9 million. Table A.1 and A.2 show the calculations for the case of $6.5 million. 




Injuries Experienced in Iraq and Implied Values of Statistical Injury 
Score on AIS 
scale 
Types of injuries  
with this score 
Willingness 











Severe to Critical 
(AIS 4 to AIS 5) 
Severe head injury  0.475  7,057,700  3,352,408 
Serious to Severe 
(AIS 3 to AIS 4) 
Amputation 0.124  7,057,700  875,155 
Moderate to Serious 
(AIS 2 to AIS 3) 
Injury resulting in 
inability to return to 
duty (does not include 
brain injury or 
amputation) 
0.037 7,057,700  261,135 
Minor to Moderate 
(AIS 1 to AIS 2) 
Injured, but no brain 
injury or amputation 
and able to return to 
duty 
0.009 7,057,700  6,3519 
 
 
In addition to the lifetime costs of injury indicated by the value of statistical life figures, 
it was necessary to take into account the direct costs associated with each type of injury. These 
include lifetime costs of care. We made the conservative assumption that only those with severe 
brain injuries and amputations would require lifetime care. Estimates commonly used by medical 
experts suggest a lifetime cost of care for brain injuries ranging from $600,000 to $4,000,000 per 
person
42 and about $45,000 to $57,000 for amputees
43 plus the cost of prosthetic limbs ranging 
from about $12,500 to about $100,000.
44  
The Department of Defense periodically announces the number of troops injured in Iraq. 
As of August 25, 2005, that number was 14,120. Using this number and the statistics cited 
above, we were able to calculate the predicted lifetime cost of injuries of all types experienced 
by soldiers from the start of the war to the present. As of August 25
th, that number stood at about 
$18 billion.  
 
                                                 
42 See, for example, National Association of State Head Injury Administrators (2005) and Neurotrauma Registry 
(2005). 
43 See, for example, Reiber et al. (1995). 
44 See, for example, Sweeney (2005) and Associated Press (2004). We make the conservative assumption that the 
patient purchases only one prosthetic limb in their lifetime.  
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U.S. calculations, 2003-2015 
We assume that there will be injuries as long as U.S. troops remain in Iraq. In a 2005 
report, the Congressional Budget Office projected troop levels in Iraq through 2015 (see Table 
A.3).
45 In order to similarly calculate the costs of injuries out to 2015, we assumed that the 
annual injury rate (about 4.3% of all troops deployed)
46 will continue through 2015. We also 
assumed that injuries would occur in the same proportions as they are currently (6% are 
amputations, 20% are brain injuries, 24% are moderate to serious, and 50% are minor to 
moderate). With these assumptions, projections of the number of future troops, and our discount 
rates of 3, 5, and 7 percent, we are able to estimate a range of injury costs into the future.  Using 
the midpoint figures of a 5% discount rate, a value of statistical life of $6.5 million (in 2000 
dollars), and lifetime costs of care, we estimate that the expected net present value of injuries to 
the U.S. from 2003-2015 is about $48 billion.  
 
Table A.3 
U.S. troop strength projected into the future 
Year  Predicted troop strength  Percent of 2005 troop 
strength 
2006 136602  0.95 
2007 107379  0.75 
2008 80874  0.56 
2009 56408  0.39 
2010 33981  0.24 
2011 33981  0.24 
2012 33981  0.24 
2013 33981  0.24 
2014 33981  0.24 




We were able to make similar calculations for coalition countries. We assumed that the 
lifetime cost of treating brain injuries and amputees is identical in the U.S. and in the coalition 
countries. We also assumed that only coalition countries reporting the death of at least one 
soldier between 2003 and August 2005 experienced any injuries of troops and that only these 
                                                 
45 See Congressional Budget Office (2005). 
46 Number of troops deployed are available from several sources. See, for example, Brookings Institution (2005), 
which uses Department of Defense data.  
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countries will experience injuries to troops in the future (a conservative assumption). In addition, 
we assumed that coalition countries would reduce their troop strength at the same rate at which 
the U.S. reduces its troop strength (see Table A.3).  
Viscusi and Aldy (2003) find an elasticity of income with respect to value of life ranging 
from 0.5 to 0.6.  We can thus take the midpoint of this estimate (0.55) and per capita income 
figures from coalition countries to estimate the value of a statistical life in each of the coalition 
countries. Adding up the totals and using a value of a statistical life in the U.S. of $6.5 million 
(in 2000 dollars), we found the cost of injuries to coalition countries to be about $2 billion 




Iraq presented unique problems because of conflicting estimates of the country’s security 
force strength in Iraq over the last two and a half years,
47  vague estimates regarding the expected 
growth in security force strength, and the fact that U.S. costs for the average lifetime care of 
injuries is likely to be much higher than in Iraq (and this data are not readily available for Iraq). 
Based on a number of assumptions, we were able to resolve these issues, but inaccuracy in our 
assumptions could affect the accuracy of our estimates. 
In general, all Iraq injury costs were computed in a similar way as the coalition costs. 
However, there are two main differences:  
First, for the coalition countries, we assumed that their numbers of troops in Iraq 
decreased over time at the same rate as the number of U.S. troops are expected to decrease. For 
Iraq, however, the size of the security force is actually growing. By August 2005 it was at about 
180,000, with a stated goal of 272,566.
48 In order to project troop size into the future, we 
assumed that the rate of grow in the later half of 2005 continues until the number of security 
forces reaches its target. We expect Iraq to reach its target by 2007. Table A.4 shows the 
predicted change over time in Iraqi security force strength as well as how it compares to the 
projected levels of U.S. troops in Iraq. We used the third column of Table A.4 as the factor by 
                                                 
47 This problem is further complicated by the fact that there has been general dispute over whether to count 
untrained troops as troops or not. 
48 The Brookings Institution (2005).  
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Iraqi Security Force Strength Projected into Future 
Year  Troop Strength  Percent of U.S. Total 
2006 265,728  1.95 
2007 272,566  2.54 
2008 272,566  3.37 
2009 272,566  4.83 
2010 272,566  8.02 
2011 272,566  8.02 
2012 272,566  8.02 
2013 272,566  8.02 
2014 272,566  8.02 
2015 272,566  8.02 
 
 
Second, we assume that the lifetime costs to care for severe brain injuries and 
amputations, in Iraq, are the U.S. costs multiplied by the ratio of Iraq’s pre-war (2002) nominal 
GDP to the 2002 nominal GDP of the U.S.. This assumption was the best one we could think of 
to account for the fact that Iraqis likely spend far less than Americans on treatment and care of 
debilitating injuries. Iraq’s nominal GDP in 2002 was about 9% of the U.S. GDP. We thus 
assume that whatever amount of money Americans spend on lifetime care of injuries, Iraqis with 
similar injuries will spend 9% of the total. Thus, because the lifetime care costs of a severe head 
injury in the U.S. range from $600,000 to $4,000,000, we expect them to range from $54,000 to 
$360,000 in Iraq. Because the lifetime cost of care of an amputation in the U.S. is $45,000 to 
$57,000, we expect it to be between $4,100 and $5,100 in Iraq. And because the cost of a 
prosthetic limb ranges from $12,500 to $100,000 in the U.S., we expect it to range from $1,100 
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